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NOTES
ELECTION OF REMEDIES IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal problems growing out of unprecedented changes in the
substantive law through modern legislation have relegated to the
background important and equally troublesome problems in the
field of procedure. Of these, the so-called doctrine of election of
remedies stands as one of the most confusing and elusive in our
legal system as is attested by the hundred or more digest para-
graphs concerning it in the Missouri Digest alone.
The rule, as generally stated by the Missouri courts, is this:
Where a party has the right to pursue one of two inconsistent
remedies, and, with knowledge of all the facts, he makes his
election and institutes his suit, in case the action thus begun is
prosecuted to final judgment, or the plaintiff has received any-
thing of value under a claim thus asserted, he cannot thereafter
pursue another and inconsistent remedy.1 The definition carries
with it its own limitations. There must in fact be two remedies
for the same wrong, otherwise no choice can exist.2 The remedies
must be inconsistent; that two remedies in fact exist is not
determinative3 The party against whom the rule is invoked must
have had knowledge of all the material facts at the time he
instituted the first action, otherwise there can be no election.4
Mere institution of an action in pursuit of one remedy is no bar
to a subsequent action in pursuit of another, for the election is
not final.5
The purpose of this article is to make a critical survey of the
doctrine as applied by the Missouri courts-its establishment,
development, and present effect.
1. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1895) 126 Mo.
344,349, 28 S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep. 675, 26 L. R. A. 840. For a collec-
tion of the varied statements of the rule see U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d)
47, 48.
2. Mistaken belief in a remedy which does not exist is no bar to another
remedy. Hartwig v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1912) 167 Mo. App. 128,
151 S. W. 477.
3. Steinbach v. Murphy (1910) 143 Mo. App. 537, 128 S. W. 207; Rey-
nolds v. Union Station Bank of St. Louis (1918) 198 Mo. App. 323, 200
S. W. 711.
4. Horigan Realty Co. v. First Nat. Bank (1925) 221 Mo. App. 329,273 S. W. 772; Horigan Realty Co. v. First Nat. Bank (1926) 221 Mo.
App. 960, 289 S. W. 352.
5. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City (1893)
116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. 813, 38 Am. St. Rep. 615. The prior suit must have
proceeded to judgment. Otto v. Young (1910) 227 Mo. 193, 127 S. W. 9.
Or the plaintiff must have received something of value. Nanson v. Jacob(1887) 93 Mo. 331, 6 S. W. 246, 3 Am. St. Rep. 531.
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II. CRITICISM
The doctrine of election of remedies has been a fruitful source
of law review comment. That it is an anomalous doctrine, a
product purely of the American courts, without any basis in
the English common law decisions and without any reason based
on principle behind it was shown in a brilliant article by Charles
P. Hine in 1913.6 Statutory abolition of the entire doctrine has
been advocated on at least two occasions.1
No adequate picture of the doctrine attempted to be applied
by the courts can be conceived unless the doctrine is clearly
distinguished from its relatives in law. It does not rest on the
principle of estoppel in pais, which requires a change of position
in reliance on some express or implied representation. The Mis-
souri courts, however, have often confused it with this principle8
Neither does it rest on waiver, which is a voluntary release of
some right.9 Likewise it cannot be based on res adjudicata, for
it has been held to operate in certain instances where the first
suit has not proceeded to judgment and the parties to the two
proceedings are not identical. 10 When the rule is thus reduced
to its naked essentials, the task of judging its utility as a legal
doctrine is greatly simplified."
6. Election of Remedies, A Criticism (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 707.
7. Rothschild, A Remedy For Election of Remedies: A Proposed Act to
Abolish Election of Remedies (1929) 14 Cornell L. Q. 141; Davidson, A
Proposal to Abolish the Doctrine of Election of Remedies (1934) 13 Ore.
L. Rev. 298. See also dissent of Brandeis, J., in United States v. Oregon
Lumber Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 290, 302, 43 S. Ct. 100, 67 L. ed. 261, espe-
cially his discussion of the leading case on this subject, Robb v. Vos (1894)
155 U. S. 13, 15 S. Ct. 4, 39 L. ed. 52.
8. So competent a judge as Judge Lamm has dismissed any scientific
classification with the remark, "There are estoppels and estoppels." Hector
v. Mann (1910) 225 Mo. 228, 245, 124 S. W. 1109; compare dissent of
Valliant, J., in the same case at 252. Three elements are necessary to an
estoppel: (1) representation by word or conduct; (2) reliance by the other
party; (3) detriment to the other party. Perhaps a fourth requisite, in-
tention, real or apparent, on the part of the actor, that such statement
or conduct will be relied on, may be added. Bigelow, Estoppel (4th ed.
1886) 445. The Missouri courts have often said an election of remedies
works an estoppel. See, e. g., U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fidelity
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 47.
9. See for criticism of the accepted definition Ewart, Waiver Distributed
(1917) 6.
10. To invoke the rule that once an issue has been tried it cannot there-
after be tried again, four elements must concur: A suit, final judgment,
identity of parties, identity of subject matter. Von Moschzisker, Stare
Decisis, Res Judicata and Other Selected Essays (1929) 32. The rule of
election of remedies applies even in the absence of any such factors. U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1937)
109 S. W. (2d) 47.
11. The rule of election between inconsistent remedies must be sharply
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III. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN MISSOURI-
THE JOHNSON-BRINKMAN CASES
The leading cases on this subject in Missouri, Johnson-Brink-
man Commission Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City,12 and
Johnson-Brinkman Commission Co. v. Missouri Pacific Railway
Co.,' 3 grew out of a complicated series of transactions and suits
involving a sale of wheat. The plaintiff company contracted to
sell this wheat to the Imboden Commission Co., terms cash on
delivery. Plaintiff delivered the original bill of lading to the
Imboden Company, receiving in return a check drawn on the
Central Bank of Kansas City, the defendant in the first of these
cases. The Imboden Company then exchanged the original bill
of lading at the offices of the railroad company for a bill in its
own name, consigning the grain to its order and marked, "Notify
C. H. Albers & Co.," to whom the Imboden Company in turn
had sold it. The new bill of lading, together with a draft drawn
on Albers & Co., was deposited with the Central Bank for col-
lection. In due course the draft was paid. The plaintiff in the
meantime had deposited the check it had received from the
Imboden Company in payment for the wheat, but on presentation
to the defendant bank payment was refused. The same day the
plaintiff sued out a writ of attachment against the Imboden Com-
pany, but the wheat was not seized under the writ, as it had
already been shipped to Albers & Co. Three weeks later the
attachment suit was dismissed, and an action for money had
and received was brought against the defendant bank. The theory
of this suit was that the defendant knew the wheat had been sold
for cash and had not been paid for; that title had not passed
to the Imboden Company; and that, therefore, the proceeds of
the wheat belonged to the plaintiff. The defendant claimed that
by virtue of bringing the attachment suit the plaintiff affirmed
title to the wheat in the Imboden Company and could not now
claim title to the wheat or to the proceeds thereof. The Supreme
Court dismissed this contention, the language of the opinion
clearly indicating that there is no separate doctrine of election
of remedies recognized, but that ordinary principles of estoppel
will be applied in an appropriate case. 14
distinguished from the rule against changing the theory of a pleading at
different stages of a single case. See Note (1937) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAW
QUARTERLY 251.
12. (1893) 116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. 813, 38 Am. St. Rep. 615.
13. (1895) 126 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep. 675, 26 L. R. A.
840.
14. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City (1893)
116 Mo. 558,575, 22 S. W. 813, 38 Am. St. Rep. 615.
19381 NOTES
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In the second case the same company brought suit against the
railway company for the wrongful taking and detention of the
wheat. The defense was raised that by bringing the attachment
suit for the purchase price the plaintiff affirmed the sale and was
barred from suing the railway company. The Kansas City Court
of Appeals so held,15 expressly stating that damage need not be
shown and admitting that it was not relying on estoppel.' 0 On
certification -to the Supreme Court, because of a conflict with
the St. Louis Court of Appeals in two prior cases,17 the decision
was reversed. The court refused to hold that the attachment suit
improvidently brought should preclude other remedies in the
absence of intervening rights of third parties. The court spoke
of election of remedies; but it is clear that what it had in mind
was estoppel.'s In effect the court announced no new principle,
but subsequent decisions were to show with what ease the phrase
"election of remedies" might be misconstrued.
What difficulties have ensued the case of Welsh v. Carder9
illustrates. One Warnick had sold plaintiff a cow, plaintiff de-
positing with Warnick as collateral a note made by a third party
and secured by a chattel mortgage on certain personal property.
Defendant subsequently became owner of the property. The
Kansas City Court of Appeals held that recovery of an unsatis-
fied judgment against Warnick for conversion of the note by
selling it to the original maker constituted an election to affirm
the transaction, and barred replevin against the defendant. But
the case showed that not only had the first suit proceeded to
judgment but the plaintiff had been credited with the amount
of the sale price of the cow. Clearly there was a recovery of
something of value. The court relied for its ruling on the case
of Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co. v. Warden,20 which it
declared bluntly to be in conflict with the Johnson-Brinkman
15. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1893) 52 Mo.
App. 407. "He [plaintiff] cannot be approbate and reprobate at the same
time." (I. c. 415).
16. Id. at 416.
17. Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh (1885) 20 Mo. App. 107; Lapp v. Ryan(1886) 23 Mo. App. 436. The latter case held that where rights of third
parties intervened, the election would be held to be final, but recognized
that in the absence of such intervening rights the mere institution of an
attachment suit would not prevent use of another inconsistent remedy.
Id. at 438.
18. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1895) 126 Mo.
344, 28 S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep. 675, 26 L. R. A. 840. Compare the
language of the court on p. 349 of the official report with that on p. 354.
19. (1902) 95 Mo. App. 41, 68 S. W. 580.
20. (1899) 151 Mo. 578, 52 S. W. 593.
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cases. The McKittrick case held that a sale of replevied goods
and collection of the proceeds constituted an election to disaffirm
the original sale to the defendant barring a claim against the
assignee for the benefit of creditors of the original purchaser of
the goods. It would seem that plaintiff's having recovered some-
thing of value in the McKittrick case would be the true ground
of distinction, but the opinion leaves much doubt.21
The exact status of the doctrine at present can be seen only
from an examination of the limitations imposed by the courts
and the results achieved in particular factual situations.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE DOCTRINE
Necessity of Choice. The law often affords to injured parties
more than one remedy without necessity of a choice. When this
is the case, the rule of election cannot properly be invoked, and
the plaintiff is free to pursue any or all such remedies. So, a
partner may sue for an accounting to recover his share of the
profits without precluding himself from a future suit for profits
thereafter accruing.22 And a suit by a principal against an agent,
who, receiving money for the principal, converts it to his own
use, will not bar a suit against a party, into whose hands the
money has come, for money had and received. 23
Inconsistency. Closely allied with the problem of necessity of
choice is the problem of consistency or inconsistency. The an-
swer to the first question is usually determined by solution of
the second. If the remedies are not inconsistent, the necessity
of choice is removed. In the case noted above of the suit for
money had and received against a third party, brought after a
suit in conversion against the agent, the court's conclusion that
the rule had no application where a party had the right to bring
more than one suit was based on the theory that the remedies
were not inconsistent. It indicated in dictum that this would
be true though there had been partial satisfaction of the first
judgment.24 This would seem to throw doubt on one of the as-
21. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co. v. Warden (1899) 151 Mo. 578,
52 S. W. 593. The determining distinction may have been any one of the
following: presence or absence of knowledge of the facts; pendency of the
first action at the time of the second; sale of the goods. Just how far this
decision goes in limiting the Johnson-Brinkman cases is not clear.
22. Steinbach v. Murphy (1910) 143 Mo. App. 537, 128 S. W. 207.
23. Reynolds v. Union Station Bank of St. Louis (1918) 198 Mo. App.
323, 200 S. W. 711.
24. Reynolds v. Union Station Bank of St. Louis (1918) 198 Mo. App.
323, 333,200 S. W. 711; accord Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co. (Mo.
App. 1924) 263 S. W. 1038; Mann v. Bank of Greenfield (1929) 323 Mo.
1000, 20 S. W. (2d) 502.
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serted bases of the doctrine, namely, that there must be an end
to litigation in the interest of the public. This case is not the
only instance where the Missouri courts have avoided the harsh-
ness of the doctrine of election of remedies. If, throughout, a
party bases his claim on the assertion of title in himself, he will
be free to pursue a series of remedies to accomplish his ends. 2
And it is settled law that one may sue joint tort feasors jointly
or severally.2 When results are made to depend upon whether
one remedy is theoretically in accord with another, the very rule
itself may justly be questioned.
Finality of Election. In the nature of things there must be a
stage in the proceedings at which a court will say that action
has gone so far as to cut off the aggrieved party from his alter-
native remedy. It is well settled in Missouri, as a result of the
Johnson-Brinkman cases, that the conclusiveness of an election
depends either (a) on the recovery of a final judgment or (b)
the receipt of anything of value under the claim originally as-
serted.27 Occasionally a Missouri court has violated this rule. In
a recent case, U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fidelty Nat.
Bank & Trust Co., it was held that a mere demand, without even
the commencement of suit or the receipt of anything of value,
constituted an election. 2 8
The technicalities connected with the whole doctrine of elec-
tion of remedies are well illustrated in the case of Brayton v.
Gunby.29 A judgment against the plaintiff in her first action to
rescind a contract had actually been obtained, but a motion for
a new trial was sustained and no appeal taken. The court allowed
a subsequent suit in deceit, holding that there was no final judg-
ment at all, since the sustaining of the motion for a new trial
left the case as if there had been no trial at all.30 The reasoning
25. Macklin v. Kinealy (1897) 141 Mo.-113, 14 S. W. 893. See also Adam
Roth Grocery Co. v. Ashton (1897) 69 Mo. App. 463.
26. McElroy v. Swenson Const. Co. (1923) 213 Mo. App. 160, 247 S. W.
209. See Myer v. Kennedy (1924) 306 Mo. 268, 267 S. W. 810, for effect
of statutory remedy on necessity of choice.
27. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City (1893)
116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. 813, 38 Am. St. Rep. 615; Johnson-Brinkman Comm.
Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1895) 126 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep.
675, 26 L. R. A. 840; Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co. v. Warden(1899) 151 Mo. 578, 52 S. W. 593; Otto v. Young (1910) 227 Mo. 193,
127 S. W. 9; Brown v. Howard (1915) 264 Mo. 466, 175 S. W. 52; Smith
v. Becker (1916) 192 Mo. App. 597, 184 S. W. 943; Cowan v. Young (1920)
282 Mo. 36, 220 S. W. 869; Tracy v. Aldrich (Mo. 1921) 236 S. W. 347;
Maiden v. Fisher (Mo. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 562.
28. (Mo. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 47.
29. (Mo. App. 1924) 267 S. W. 450.
30. Id. at 452.
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seems highly specious. The plaintiff had gone much further in
the Brayton case than the plaintiff in the Fidelity case; she had
had her day in court and ought not be allowed to "blow hot and
cold."
Mistake. Perhaps the most important limitation on the rule of
election of remedies is the principle of mistake. Mistake may
take either of two forms: (1) Absence of knowledge of all the
material facts at the time of the first action ;31 (2) mistake as
to the availability of the legal remedy first attempted.3 2 The first
presupposes a judgment, or the recovery of something of value,
otherwise the ordinary rule that mere commencement of an in-
consistent remedy is not sufficient to bar later action could be
invoked by the plaintiff.3 3 The second concerns the lack of suffi-
cient evidence to sustain the first action or the unavailability as
a matter of law of the first remedy. It has no reference to a case
where the plaintiff has alternative remedies against two or more
parties and has misjudged the solvency of the party first sued.34
An interesting extension of the principle of mistake was applied
in Central Savings Bank v. Danckmeyer.3 5 As surety for one
Steffens, Danckmeyer had signed a note payable to the plaintiff
bank, on maturity of which a renewal note was delivered to the
bank purporting to be signed by Steffens and Danckmeyer. The
old note was marked "paid" and surrendered to Steffens. In fact,
Danckmeyer's signature on the renewal note was a forgery. The
bank was informed but, being doubtful, sued Danckmeyer on the
renewal note. A verdict was returned for Danckmeyer. The bank
then sued Danckmeyer on the original note, and the defense
raised was election of remedies. Despite the express finding that
the bank had been informed of the forgery, the Kansas City
Court of Appeals said there had been a mistake of fact.38 The
31. Central Savings Bank v. Danckmeyer (1897) 70 Mo. App. 168;
Haughawout v. Royse (1906) 122 Mo. App. 72, 98 S. W. 101; Stephens v.
Steckdaub (1920) 202 Mo. App. 392, 217 S. W. 817; Horigan Realty Co. v.
First Nat. Bank (1926) 221 Mo. App. 960, 289 S. W. 352.
32. Hill v. Combs (1902) 92 Mo. App. 242; Hartwig v. Security Mut. Life
Ins. Co. (1912) 167 Mo. App. 128, 151 S. W. 477; Fitzgerrell v. Fed. Trust
Co. (Mo. App. 1916) 187 S. W. 600; Autocar Sales & Service Co. of Mo. v.
Holscher (Mo. App. 1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 1072.
33. See cases cited supra, notes 31 and 32.
34. Welsh v. Carder (1902) 95 Mo. App. 41, 68 S. W. 580.
35. (1897) 70 Mo. App. 168.
36. "We cannot see how the law as to election of remedies can find
application to such facts. Plaintiff refused to believe that the second note
was a forgery, brought suit thereon and was defeated. To hold that such
mistake of fact would defeat an action on a separate and distinct instru-
ment affecting another transaction would be a great injustice to say the
least." Id. at 174.
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same court adopted a liberal attitude in Haughawout v. Royse,
in which the plaintiff acquired full knowledge of his rights dur-
ing the pendency of the first action, and it was held that he need
not dismiss the action but could press it to judgment and later
prosecute an additional remedy.37
In the main, the Missouri courts have applied the principle of
mistake liberally to alleviate some of the harshness of the doc-
trine of election, keeping in mind that the doctrine normally oper-
ates in favor of the wrongdoer and against the party wronged.
V. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
The effect of the doctrine can best be observed from an enu-
meration of the varied classes of fact situations in which it has
been invoked and by a comparison of the results achieved.
Election between continuation and termination of contractual
relations. Writers have frequently asserted that a large measure
of the misunderstanding of the doctrine of election of remedies
has arisen through the failure of the courts to draw the distinc-
tion between election of rights and election of remedies.38 Strictly
speaking the doctrine itself pertains not to substantive but to
adjective or procedural law. Thus, in the field of contractual
relations, it is said that one remedy bars recourse to another, not
because the remedies may be inconsistent, but because the bring-
ing of the first action operates as evidence of the affirmance or
disaffirmance of a certain transaction, thereby fixing the plain-
tiff's substantive rights and precluding remedies to enforce rights
which he no longer possesses.39 Ordinarily, however, this distinc-
tion is more illusory than real.
It is elementary that one who with full knowledge of the facts,
has done an act which implies an intention to abide by a contract,
cannot subsequently sue for a rescission; and if he does an act
which implies an intention to disaffirm the contract, he cannot
later sue for damages.40 It has been stated that the bringing of
37. (1906) 122 Mo. App. 72, 98 S. W. 101 (recovery of goods in specie
under writ of replevin, and action for damages for costs expended in prose-
cuting an unsuccessful suit against a party to whom defendant had trans-
ferred plaintiff's goods).
38. See Deinard and Deinard, Election of Remedies (1922) 6 Minn. L.
Rev. 341, 347.
39. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City (1893)
116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. 813, 38 Am. St. Rep. 615; Johnson-Brinkman Comm.
Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1895) 126 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep.
675, 26 L. R. A. 840. If the distinction had been observed, it would seem
that the sustaining of a motion for new trial after final judgment would
not affect the election of the substantive right already made. But see Bray-
ton v. Gunby (Mo. App. 1924) 267 S. W. 450, noted in text.
40. Bush v. Norman (Mo. App. 1917) 199 S. W. 721.
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a suit is such a decisive act, even though the suit has not pro-
ceeded to judgment.41 This is, strictly, a matter of choice of
right3, not remedies. So also in the field of substantive rights,
according to strict logic, would lie the duty to elect whether or
not to abide by a contract voidable for fraud.4 2 These cases con-
stitute an exception to the principle laid down in the Johnson-
Brinkman cases that mere institution of a suit will not be re-
garded as a conclusive election. 43 If, as is sometimes asserted,
the true bases for election of remedies are the same that underlie
res adjudicata-that no man shall be twice vexed for the same
cause and that it is in the interest of the public that there shall
be an end to litigation,-it is hard to reconcile such holdings with
the view that when a contract is voidable for fraud, the de-
frauded party may commence a suit for damages for breach of
contract44 or for rescission45 without barring the tort remedy of
deceit, so long as the first action is not carried to judgment.46
Furthermore one may sometimes, by using the legal device of
waiver of tort, assert ownership of goods at one time and compel
payment of the reasonable value of the goods (which in law now
belong to the defendant) at another.47 And the mere institution
of a suit for specific performance will not bar another suit for
damages.48 Where, however, the aggrieved party recovers any-
thing of value from the estate of the wrongdoer, he will be
estopped from pursuing other remedies.49
41. City Light, Power etc. Co. v. St. Mary's Mach. Co. (1913) 170 Mo.
App. 224, 156 S. W. 83. Compare Restatement, Contracts (1932) see. 381.
42. Taylor v. Short (1891) 107 Mo. 384, 17 S. W. 970; Paquin v. Milli-
ken (1901) 163 Mo. 79, 73 S. W. 417. These two cases must be carefully
distinguished. "This is not an effort to rescind by the discovery of another
incident in the same fraud, but the prompt exercise of the right as soon
as the fraud which would support a rescission was ascertained." Paquin v.
Milliken, supra, at 102.
43. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City (1893)
116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. 813, 38 Am. St. Rep. 615; Johnson-Brinkman Comm.
Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1895) 126 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep.
675, 26 L. R. A. 840.
44. Maiden v. Fisher (Mo. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 563.
45. Brayton v. Gunby (Mo. App. 1924) 267 S. W. 450.
46. See Hine, Election of Remedies, A Criticism (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev.
707, 711.
47. Cowan v. Young (1920) 282 Mo. 36, 220 S. W. 869; see also Adam
Roth Grocery Co. v. Ashton (1897) 69 Mo. App. 463; Corbin, Waiver of
Tort and Suit in Assumpsit (1910) 19 Yale L. J. 221, 223, 224.
48. Otto v. Young (1910) 227 Mo. 193, 127 S. W. 9; accord Restatement,
Contracts (1932) sec. 382. This is true whether the suit for specific per-
formance was brought prior to the suit for damages, or the suit for damages
was the first action. Tracy v. Aldrich (Mo. 1921) 236 S. W. 347.
49. Nanson v. Jacob (1887) 93 Mo. 331, 6 S. W. 246, 3 Am. St. Rep. 531.
Election between the statutory remedy of recovering from bank officers
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Remedies against agent or trustee and recipient of converted
funds 0 However stringent their application of the doctrine of
election of remedies in other cases, the courts have refused to
permit a party into whose hands converted funds have come to
defend on the ground that a judgment has been obtained against
the converter.51 It must be emphasized that while the court in
such a situation will not permit double recovery, yet it permits
action to proceed to final judgment. One opinion has gone so far
in dictum as to say that even partial satisfaction of the first
judgment will not preclude a suit against the third party for the
for acceptance of deposits at a time the bank is known to be insolvent and
common law remedies is not required. Eastin v. Bank of Harrisonville
(1922) 213 Mo. App. 130, 246 S. W. 991.
50. Another problem, not governed by the doctrine of election of remedies,
but closely related thereto, is the necessity of election between the liability
of an agent and his undisclosed principal. See Clayton, Election Between
the Liability of an Agent and his Undisclosed Principal (1925) 3 Tex. L.
Rev. 384. The law is clearly established that upon acquiring knowledge of a
previously undisclosed agency, the third party must elect whether he will
hold the agent or the principal. Ames Packing & Prov. Co. v. Tucker (1879)
8 Mo. App. 95; Autocar Sales & Service Co. of Mo. v. Holscher (Mo. App.
1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 1072. The theoretical basis for such a ruling has con-
fused the commentators. Note (1929) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 265; 2 Mechem,
Agency (1914) 1331, sec. 1750 et seq. The problem is similar to that pre-
sented in the true election of remedies cases, namely, what kind of action
will amount to an election. Where the agency has been disclosed at the
outset of the transaction, and the third party does not demand joint lia-
bility but contents himself with the security given by the agent and deals
with the agent, we need not resort to any fiction of "election." It is simply
a case where no liability ever existed on the part of the principal. Ames
Packing & Prov. Co. v. Tucker (1879) 8 Mo. App. 95; Schepflin V. Dessar
(1886) 20 Mo. App. 569. But where liability may be fixed either on the
agent who failed to disclose the agency or on the subsequently discovered
but hitherto undisclosed principal, the courts have required an election.
Sessions v. Block (1890) 40 Mo. App. 569; Negbaur v. Fogel Const.
Co. (Mo. App. 1933) 58 S. W. (2d) 346. Whether the mere institution
of suit against one of the parties will amount to an election seems not
to have been passed on directly. Certainly a mere demand on one of the
parties does not constitute an election. Banjo v. Wacker (Mo. App. 1923)
251 S. W. 456. Nor does a mere bookkeeping change for a short time.
Weiselman v. Anderson (Mo. App. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 905. At any rate
the courts have kept this group of cases distinct from the general doctrine
of election of remedies, and care must be taken not to carry their ratio
decidendi into unrelated cases. See Autocar Sales & Service Co. of Mo. v.
Holscher (Mo. App. 1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 1072, classifying this type of
case as if within the general doctrine of election of remedies.
51. Reynolds v. Union Station Bank of St. Loflis (1918) 198 Mo. App.
323, 200 S. W. 711; Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Ripley County Bank (1921)
208 Mo. App. 560, 237 S. W. 182; Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co.
(Mo. App. 1924) 263 S. W. 1038; see also Trimble v. Wollman (1897) 71
Mo. App. 467 (forged stock certificate; whether failure to act amounts to
election); Horigan Realty Co. v. First Nat. Bank (1925) 221 Mo. App.
329, 273 S. W. 772.
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balance.52 Why have the courts permitted the following of con-
verted funds, even though the plaintiff has knowledge of all the
facts at the time of instituting the first action? The answer is
that no inconsistency in theory can be found. 53
So, too, the courts permit additional remedies after judgment
against the bondsmen of a trustee wrongfully misappropriating
trust funds.54 U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fidelity Nat.
Bank-5 well illustrates the extreme to which the doctrine may
be carried if not kept within proper bounds. Plaintiff surety
company contracted to indemnify the Continental Construction
Company against loss by reason of the dishonesty of its em-
ployees. One Chaney, a payroll clerk of the Continental, padded
the payroll sheets with names of former employees, took them
to the proper officer of the company for verification and signa-
ture of pay checks, and then abstracted the checks, forged in-
dorsements, and cashed them at defendant bank. When the Con-
tinental learned of these peculations, it demanded return of the
money from Chaney. Failing to get it, it made demand upon
the plaintiff. Plaintiff reimbursed the Continental and took a
release. Subsequently plaintiff received an assignment from Con-
tinental's successor of its claim against all parties including
defendant. The Kansas City Court of Appeals assumed that the
plaintiff was subrogated to the rights of the Continental by
virtue of either the release or the subsequent assignment. The
issue in the case, therefore, was whether, by making a technical
demand on Chaney, the Continental (and consequently plaintiff,
which stood in the shoes of Continental) had elected to hold
Chaney and had cut itself off from its remedy against the bank
for paying out Continental's money without legal authority.56
52. Reynolds v. Union Station Bank of St. Louis (1918) 198 Mo. App.
323, 333, 200 S. W. 711.
53. "This suit is based upon the theory that defendant is liable to ac-
count to the plaintiff for all his money collected upon the checks payable
to plaintiff, because the forged indorsements thereon of plaintiff's name did
not pass title to Ferguson [the embezzler]. The suit against Ferguson is
based upon the theory that he did not obtain title to plaintiff's checks and
money by his embezzlements, and that he is liable to account therefor to
plaintiff. Neither suit is based on the theory that title passed to Ferguson.
Both are based on the theory that title did not pass." (Italics supplied.)
Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1924) 263 S. W. 1038, 1044.
54. Mann v. Bank of Greenfield (Mo. 1929) 20 S. W. (2d) 502.
55. (Mo. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 47.
56. The printed form which Continental filed with the surety company
stated that the sums "have not been paid over or satisfied in any way what-
ever to the said Employer, except as herein stated, have been fraudulently
misappropriated by said Employee to his own use and benefit with the
intent to deprive the said Employer of same, notwithstanding that due and
legal demand has been made by the said Employer upon the said Employee
for the same." Id. at 49.
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The court held that there had been an election and that plaintiff
was thus "estopped" from asserting its claim against the de-
fendant. The court added insult to injury by concluding: "The
result reached hereby is not only logical, but it is just and equi-
table; and the goal ever sought by the law is justice and equity,
reached by logical reasoning."5 7 The Continental's attempt to
save the bank from loss, by demanding reimbursement from the
real culprit, actually saved the bank from paying for its wrongful
act! This is the "justice" to which the court referred. No Mis-
souri case involving a similar fact situation was cited by the
court to sustain its position. 8 In fact the very portion of one of
the Johnson-Brinkman cases cited by the court as laying down
the general rule of election of remedies would lead to the opposite
conclusion 9 In holding that the technical demand on Chaney,
under the claim that he had embezzled Continental's money, con-
stituted an election, the court flew in the face of all prior deci-
sions holding that either a judgment must be obtained or some-
thing of value be realized. Furthermore it overlooked the ana-
logous cases holding that where funds have been misappropri-
ated, the owner may have his remedies against anyone into whose
57. Ibid.
58. The court cited Tower v. Compton Hill Improvement Co. (1905) 192
Mo. 379, 91 S. W. 104, and Johnson-Brinktnan Comm. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co. (1894) 126 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep. 675, 26 L. R. A.
840, in support of the general doctrine of election of remedies. The court
cited three cases from other jurisdictions involving the proposition at hand.
In two of them a suit had been brought and had proceeded to final judg-
ment. Fowler v. Bowery Say. Bank (1889) 113 N. Y. 450, 21 N. E. 172,
10 Am. St. Rep. 479, 4 L. R. A. 145; Jones v. First Nat. Bank of Lincoln(1902) 3 Neb. (unof.) 73, 90 N. W. 912. The court in the third case, in
the course of a long opinion, did indeed say that asking for, or accepting
relief, against the forger would amount to an election. Midland Savings &
Loan Co. v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank (C. C. A. 8, 1932) 57 F. (2d) 686,
693, 697. It is interesting to note that one of the cases relied on in the
Midland opinion was the Jones case, noted herein, where a final judgment
had been rendered in the first action. See for discussion of the problem
Note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 293, 303.
59. "It is well settled law where a party has the right to pursue one of
two inconsistent remedies, and he makes his election and institutes his
suit, that in case the action thus begun is prosecuted to final judgment,
or the plaintiff has received anything of value under a claim thus asserted,
he cannot thereafter pursue another, and inconsistent remedy." Johnson-
Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1894) 126 Mo. 344,349, 28
S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep. 675, 26 L. R. A. 840. The court in the Fidelity
case itself inserted the italics! Again the court recognized that something
more than mere demand is necessary to make an election conclusive, by
saying: "Where one elects to pursue one of two or more inconsistent
remedies * * * and receives full satisfaction therefrom * * *," he can no
longer pursue the other remedy. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fidelity
Nat. Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 47, 49.
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hands they have come until he gets full satisfaction. The an-
swer to the contention made in those cases could well have been
made here, namely, that the remedies were not inconsistent, that
the action of Continental in demanding reimbursement from its
agent was a clear disaffirmance of the agent's acts, and in the
suit against the bank the plaintiff was still disaffirming the trans-
action. 1 The case is clearly out of line, and it is doubtful whether
the Supreme Court would sustain the holding.
Relationship of election of remedies to the law of security
transactions. The doctrine of election of remedies extends its
influence into the law of security transactions as in other fields.
Of the problems involved, one of the most important practically
is the necessity of election of remedies by a vendor of chattels
sold under a conditional sale contract after default has occurred.2
The local decisions, however, have already been thoroughly re-
viewed,3 and further comment is unnecessary.
The question whether a chattel mortgagee by attaching the
goods waives his right to proceed by virtue of his mortgage lien
has been answered affirmatively. In Ottumwa Nat. Bank v.
Totten, the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that a mortgagee, by
suing the debtor-mortgagor on the notes (which the mortgage
secured) and attaching the goods, "waived" his claim to the
mortgaged goods as against one to whom the mortgagor had
sold the goods.4
An interesting situation was presented in Brown v. Essig65
A mortgagee under a deed of trust released the deed of trust
when the mortgaged property was conveyed to him, but agreed
to resell to the mortgagor for practically the amount secured by
the deed of trust. In the meantime a trust company had secured
a judgment against the mortgagor, by virtue of which it had a
lien on the land. Learning of this, the original mortgagee sued
the mortgagor in attachment based on the contract of resale. In
60. Reynolds v. Union Station Bank of St. Louis (1918) 198 Mo. App.
323, 200 S. W. 711; Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Ripley County Bank (1921)
208 Mo. App. 560, 237 S. W. 182; Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co.
(Mo. App. 1924) 263 S. W. 1038.
61. See particularly Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co. (Mo. App.
1924) 263 S. W. 1038.
62. See the leading Missouri case of Twentieth Century Mach. Co. v.
Excelsior Springs Bottling Co. (Mo. App. 1914) 171 S. W. 940; Comment
(1915) 7 Mo. L. Bull. 44.
63. Note (1932) 17 ST. Louis LAw REviuw 143.
64. (1902) 94 Mo. App. 596, 68 S. W. 386, citing the leading case of
Evans v. Warren (1887) 122 Mass. 303; see also 2 Jones, Chattel Mort-
gages and Conditional Sales (6th ed. 1933) 328, sec. 565.
65. (Mo. App. 1927) 1 S. W. (2d) 855.
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a suit against the trust company for reinstatement of the deed
of trust to establish priority over the judgment lien obtained by
the trust company, it was contended that the attachment suit,
which had proceeded to judgment, barred the suit for reinstate-
ment of the deed of trust. The Kansas City Court of Appeals
held that even though the attachment suit had proceeded to judg-
ment, it was not an inconsistent remedy. While the court gave
no reasons for its decision, the theory seems to have been that
the plaintiff was affirming legal title in the mortgagor in both
actions. Here again the fictitious and theoretical nature of the
doctrine is apparent, since the result is made to depend not on
whether anyone has changed his position in reliance on the first
action or how far the first action had proceeded, but whether
the remedies are in theory consistent.66
Problems growing out of land transactions. Cases which might
properly be classified here have been discussed incidentally in
other portions of this article. A few, however, deserve special
notice. In Branner v. Klaber17 plaintiff sued to cancel a deed of
land given defendant in exchange for some worthless stock, which
defendant had fraudulently induced plaintiff to accept. Failing
in this effort, plaintiff then asked the court t6 establish a vendor's
lien on the land. The court said that the suit based on repudia-
tion was inconsistent with affirmance of the transaction and es-
tablishment of the vendor's lien.8 If this is the basis of deci-
sion, then the court entirely lost sight of the established rule
that pursuit of a non-existent remedy is no bar to subsequent
inconsistent action.6
The case of Macklin v. Kinealy0 is an illustration of the length
to which a party may go if he asserts title in himself at all stages
of the various remedies. The emphasis, of course, is still on the
theoretical bases of the suits.7'
An interesting application of the doctrine presents itself when
66. See for a sounder approach Boogher v. Frazier (1889) 99 Mo. 325,
12 S. W. 885 (estoppel in pais).
67. (1932) 330 Mo. 306, 49 S. W. (2d) 169.
68. Id. at 332.
69. See cases cited supra, notes 31 and 32.
70. (1897) 141 Mo. 113, 41 S. W. 893.
71. "Defendant's main contention is that the circuit court erred in hold-
ing that the plaintiff was not estopped from maintaining this suit by reason
of her action in prosecuting the suit for the recovery of the possession of
the premises and her subsequent compromise thereof as found by the court.
We do not think the authorities cited support this contention. Her action
in this behalf certainly cannot be considered a ratification of the defendants'
act in conveying the property, which conveyance she was continually at-
tacking and asserting title against." Id. at 120.
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a public utility wrongfully enters premises, appropriating land
for its right of way. That there may be a suit for damages or
ejectment, but not both, was the conclusion of the Missouri Su-
preme Court in Tooker v. Missouri Power & Light Co. 72 Prac-
tical exigencies and the interest of the public, rather than any
theoretical inconsistencies in the remedies, seem to require this
result. The court relied on another supreme court case reaching
the same result, though the facts and basis for the decision were
not alike7 3 There, land was sold with certain mutual convenants.
The grantee breached his covenant, whereupon the grantor pro-
ceeded to violate his covenant. It was held that, having done this,
the grantor could no longer bring ejectment.7 4 In that case the
rights and remedies arose out of consensual relations. Moreover
the right-remedy approach becomes useful. The grantor had a
right to be relieved of the obligations binding on him. He elected
this right in preference to the right to regard the covenant as
broken and could no longer assert the right to regard the cove-
nant as broken by the remedy of ejectment. The decisions in both
cases may be justified, but it is important to distinguish them.
VI. CONCLUSION
No attempt has been made to delve into all the ramifications
of this complicated doctrine, even in a single jurisdiction75
72. (1935) 336 Mo. 592, 80 S. W. (2d) 691, 101 A. L. R. 365.
73. Tower v. Compton Hill Imp. Co. (1905) 192 Mo. 379, 393, 91 S. W.
104.
74. The plaintiff-grantor had successfully defended an action by the de-
fendant-grantee to enjoin him from violating his convenant. The action
was dismissed for want of equity in the grantee. Compton Hill Imp. Co. v.
Tower's Ex'rs (1900) 158 Mo. 282, 59 S. W. 239. It is clear that it was
action prior to the defense of the suit that worked the election, and not
the defense of the suit itself. Tower v. Compton Hill Imp. Co. (1905) 192
Mo. 379, 393, 91 S. W. 104. See Bell v. Butte Inv. Co. (Mo. 1923) 250 S. W.
381, where defense of a suit in ejectment was held a bar to a suit, by the
winning defendant in the first suit, for damages for fraud in obtaining
title. True estoppel was apparent in that case.
75. In the following cases, listed by date, the court discussed election of
remedies, although many involved statutory interpretation, res adjudicata,
ratification, and other grounds for decision. Union R. R. & Transp. Co. v.
Traube (1875) 59 Mo. 355 (res adjudicata); MacMurray-Judge Architec-
tural Iron Co. v. City of St. Louis (1897) 138 Mo. 608, 39 S. W. 467 (in-
junction against changing grade of street bars suit for damages); Lilly v.
Menke (1898) 143 Mo. 137, 44 S. W. 730 (estoppel); Smoot v. Judd (1904)
184 Mo. 508, 83 S. W. 481 (suit on sheriff's bond for false return bars
suit to quash execution and set aside sale of property) ; State ex rel. Kim-
brell v. Peoples Ice, etc. Co. (1912) 246 Mo. 168, 200, 151 S. W. 101 (in-
consistency of quo warranto and injunction); Deer v. Deer's Estate (Mo.
App. 1915) 180 S. W. 572 (election between common law and statutory
remedies); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas City & I. Air Line Co. (1915) 189
Mo. 538, 88 S. W. 3 (change in theory of pleading); Hunnell v. Zinn (Mo.
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Rather the purpose has been to show (1) the extent to which
the doctrine cuts across the whole field of law; (2) its fictitious
and theoretical nature; (3) the departures made by the Missouri
cases from the holdings in the Johnson-Brinkman cases. A priori
it would seem that the injured party should be allowed to pursue
the remedies afforded by law until made whole for his losses,
unless barred by independent operation of an estoppel in pais
or res adjudicata. The greatest hardship is presented when the
aggrieved party may seek relief from either of two parties, but
must judge ahead the solvency of the respective parties at his
peril. The clear holdings of the Missouri courts, however, are to
the effect that when, in legal theory, the remedies are incon-
sistent, pursuit of one remedy to judgment or the receipt of
something of value will bar further relief.76 The difficulty has
been that the courts have sometimes failed to observe these limi-
tations and have labelled the abortive attempt to secure relief
an election of remedies. The few limitations on the doctrine
should be carefully guarded lest the law favor the wrongdoer at
the expense of the wronged.
SIGMUND BARACK.
1916) 184 S. W. 1154 (resulting trust and advancement); Highfield v.
United Magazine Press (Mo. App. 1916) 190 S. W. 926 (election between
statutory and common law remedies); Smith v. Berryman (1917) 272 Mo.
365, 199 S. W. 165, 1 A. L. R. 1692 (mandamus and suit for damages for
false return to the alternative writ); Headlee v. Cain (Mo. App. 1923) 250
S. W. 611 (judgment against escrow holder of note for wrongful delivery
bars defense against holder of note); Doebbling v. Quimby (1927) 221
Mo. App. 1178, 299 S. W. 629 (ejectment bars replevin for unsevered
crops); Langford v. Fanning (Mo. App. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 726 (election
between statutory and common law remedies for wrongful levy); Berry-
man v. People's Motorbus Co. of St. Louis (1932) 228 Mo. App. 1032, 54
S. W. (2d) 747, cert. quashed State ex rel. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. v.
Becker (1933) 334 Mo. 115, 66 S. W. (2d) 141 (election between common
law and statutory remedies).
76. Johnson-Brinkman Comm. Co. v. Central Bank of Kansas City (1893)
116 Mo. 558, 22 S. W. 813, 38 Am. St. Rep. 615; Johnson-Brinkman Comm.
Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1895) 126 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870, 47 Am. St. Rep.
675, 26 L. R. A. 840.
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